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COMMENTS
JUDICIAL PROMULGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POLICY: EFFICIENCY AT
THE EXPENSE OF DEMOCRACY
by
Becky Stern

I.

INTRODUCTION

UBLIC school financing has long been one of the most complex areas
of social policy. The perpetual problems faced by property-poor
school districts have been at the forefront of public concern and
awareness for many years. As a result of such concerns, legislatures have
been continually reevaluating state educational funding programs. Unfortunately, legislative actions have failed to remedy the inequalities generated by
funding systems based on local property wealth.' Because of legislative inability to eradicate disparities, these problems have recently been taken to
the courts. 2 Concerned citizens of many states are now taking their complaints regarding legislatively imposed financing programs to the judiciary
for resolution. The public attempt to use the courts, rather than the traditional legislative process, to remedy such problems is but a symptom of the
nation's growing tendency to use the easiest and most convenient method to
solve complex issues. 3 As this paper will demonstrate, such ease and convenience comes at the expense of one of the central tenets of our democratic
form of government; namely, the separation of powers doctrine.
The Texas Supreme Court recently acquiesced to pressures imposed by
citizens seeking relief from the present system of public school financing in
4
Texas. In Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (Edgewood I),
sixty-eight school districts, as well as individual schoolchildren and parents,
successfully argued that the state's system of public school financing was
unconstitutional. The supreme court's decision included an injunction
which prohibited the state from funding the public school system after May
1, 1990, unless the legislature remedied the constitutional problems in the
1.
2.
3.
4.

See
See
See
777

infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
infra notes 13, 160.
infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) [hereinafter Edgewood I].
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existing system. 5 As a result, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 1
which adopted a new program for school financing; 6 however, on September
24, 1990, the District Court for Travis County held the new program unconstitutional as well. 7 Nevertheless, the district court vacated the supreme
court's injunction and required the legislature to adopt yet another program
for school financing by September 1, 1991.8 The district court's opinion also
made clear that, should an adequate solution not be forthcoming, a courtimposed program would go into effect. 9 In Edgewood II, the Texas Supreme
Court reviewed both the district court's decision and Senate Bill 1.10 Again,
the court concluded that the Texas Legislature's scheme for public school
financing was unconstitutional.' Furthermore, the court reinstated its previous injunction, but stayed its effects until April 1, 1991.12 The court's actions in this case constitute a novel intrusion into what has, in Texas,
historically been considered a legislative function. In this comment I will
demonstrate that the determination of the appropriate system for public
school financing constitutes a political question and, as such, is nonjusticiable. While the problems with educational financing clearly warrant attention, this comment will demonstrate that courts are not the appropriate
forums for dealing with such problems.
Section II will be devoted to an historical analysis of education law in
Texas. The discussion will include an overview of the education provisions
in the eight Texas constitutions as well as the statutory schemes adopted to
implement the constitutional requirements. In addition, this section will
summarize the state's current public school financing program. Section III
will survey the current state of the law in the area of public school financing.
Through an examination of various state court decisions, this section will
consider the alternatives available to courts faced with public school financing litigation. Section IV will demonstrate that application of the political
question doctrine is the appropriate alternative for courts to use in school
financing cases and, in particular, should have been the Texas Supreme
5. Id. at 399.
6. Act of June 7, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C. S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1.
7. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, No. 362516 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County,
250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept. 24, 1990),judgment vacated in part, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.
1991) [hereinafter Edgewood II].
8. Id. at 39.
9. Id.
10. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
11. Id. at 491.
12. Id. at 492. Since the time of this writing, the legislature adopted yet another program
for public school financing. Act of April 11, 1991, ch. 20, §§ 16.001-21.930, 1991 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 20 (Vernon). Known as the "Robin Hood" plan, the program shifts funds from
property-rich school districts to property-poor districts, imposes a minimum property tax rate,
and increases state aid to education. Id. §§ 16.252, 16.501; see also Highlights of the "Robin
Hood" School FinancePlan, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 8, 1991, at I A, col. 3. Unhappy with
the consequences of the new financing system, a number of property-rich districts went to
court to challenge the constitutionality of the new plan. In an historic decision, the district
court upheld the Robin Hood Plan. See Judge OKs Texas School Finance Law, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 8, 1991, at IA, col. 1. The issue does not appear to be resolved, however, since
the propety-rich districts plan to appeal the district court's decision. Id.
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Court's response in Edgewood I & II. Additional concerns raised by this
type of litigation will also be presented to emphasize the nonjusticiable nature of the current controversies. Section V will conclude the article.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Much public school financing litigation has been based on the considerable disparities in per pupil expenditures found among districts. 13 In order to
better understand why current state programs are failing to remedy the
problems faced by property-poor school districts, a review of the development of educational financing is appropriate. In particular, a review of
Texas educational financing, while admittedly peculiar to the state, will be
instructive on how the current financial disparities between districts have
arisen in many states.
Education law in Texas, as well as in many other states, has been primarily a combination of constitutional and statutory law. 14 The Texas Constitution delegates educational authority to the legislative branch of
government. 15 The constitution not only defines the limits of legislative au-6
thority but also serves as a guideline for meeting educational requirements.'
Since the constitution is not self-executing, the Texas Legislature enacts statutes in order to implement the constitutional requirements. 17 The first part
of this section will consider the evolution of the education provisions of the
eight Texas constitutions' 8 and the statutory schemes designed to implement
their requirements. In so doing, this section will (1) highlight the historical
problems faced in financing the Texas educational system and, (2) shed light
on the problems property-poor school districts now face. The second part of
the discussion will review the current financing structure of Texas public
schools.
13. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635, 637 (1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd.
of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 761 (Md. 1983); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, 276
(1973); Board of the City School Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d
813, 815 (1979).
14. Administrative and case law also constitute sources of education law in Texas. C.
FUNKHOUSER, EDUCATION IN TEXAS: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 60-63 (5th
ed. 1986).
15. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
16. TEX. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 3.
17. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 60-63.
18. The first constitution was adopted in 1827 and was entitled CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF COAHUILA Y TEXAS (1827), reprinted in 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 423
(1898). 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 219 (W. Swindler
ed. 1979) [hereinafter W. Swindler]. Seven other constitutions governed the State of Texas,
including: Plans and Powers of the Provisional Government of Texas (1835), reprinted in
TEX. CONST. app. 511 (Vernon 1955); Constitution of the Republic of Texas (1836), reprinted
in TEX. CONST. app. 523 (Vernon 1955); TEX. CONST. of 1845; TEX. CONST. of 1861; TEX.
CONST. of 1866; TEX. CONST. of 1869; and TEX. CONST. See Watts & Rockwell, The Original
Intent of the Education Article of the Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 776 n.19
(1990). See also W. Swindler, supra, at 240-351.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

A. Education and the Texas Constitutions
The first Texas Constitution was promulgated by the Mexican government
in 1827.19 Although the Mexican government authorized a system of municipal education, the Texas residents were poor and, as a result, the government failed to vigorously pursue a structured, reliable system of statewide
education. 20 A second constitution 2' was promulgated by the Mexican authorities in 1833; however, it also failed to promote a strong educational
system for the state. 22 In fact, one reason Texans revolted against the Mexican government was its failure to provide an adequate system of public
schools. 23 Needless to say, when Texas achieved its independence from
Mexico, the framers of the new constitution made little use of the educational provisions from the earliest state constitutions.
The Republic of Texas promulgated its first constitution in 1836 and required the legislature to provide the state with a system of public education. 24 Despite the high-minded ideals espoused by the framers of the new
constitution, the first Texas legislature failed to adopt any provisions for the
financing of a statewide system of education. 25 The legislature's inaction
was likely a result of the fact that the state government was virtually penniless. 26 When the legislature did finally enact a law for the financing of public
schools, they did so through a system of land grants. 27 Between 1839 and
19. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF COAHUILA Y TEXAS (1827), reprinted in
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 423 (1898); see W. Swindler, supra note 18, at 219-39.
20. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 145.

21. Plans and Powers of the Provisional Government of Texas (1835), reprintedin

1 H.
TEX.

CONST. app. 511 (Vernon 1955).

22. See W. Swindler, supra note 18, at 240.
23. The Texas Declaration of Independence of 1836 illustrated the hostility felt toward
the Mexican government when it stated that the Mexican government had:
failed to establish any public system of education, although possessed of almost
boundless resources, (the public domain), and although it is an axiom in political science, that unless a people are educated and enlightened, it is idle to expect
the continuance of civil liberty, or the capacity for self-government.
F. Eby, The First Century of Public Education in Texas, Centennial Handbook, Texas Public
Schools, 1854-1954, Texas Education Agency (1954), reprintedin C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note
14, at 145. See also The Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Texas (1836), reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 519 (Vernon 1955).
24. "It shall be the duty of congress, as soon as circumstances will permit, to provide by
law, a general system of education." Constitution of the Republic of Texas, General Provisions § 5 (1836), reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 523 (Vernon 1955). See also 1 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 1078-79 (1898).
25. F. STEWART & J. CLARK, THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF TEXAS 103

(1933). See also Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 777.
26. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 146.
27.
To Texas pioneers, the accepted method of founding educational institutions was to endow them with large tracts of land. The founders of Texas were
inspired by the vision of an empire where every child would receive a general
education on the bounty of their state...
Fabulously rich in unoccupied land but lacking income, the great-hearted
Texans proposed to found a school system, from the primary grade through the
university, entirely on the bounty of the state. The "boundless resources" dedicated to the education of oncoming generations would, they believed, make the
imposition of fees and taxes forever unnecessary.
C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 145-46.
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1840 the legislature set aside over four million acres of land to be used for
the establishment of a primary school system. 28 Despite these generous
grants of land, however, a statewide educational system was not
29
forthcoming.
Texas joined the Union in 1845, and soon thereafter a constitutional con-

vention adopted the first constitution of the State of Texas. 30 The new constitution required, in stricter language than before, that the state legislature

implement, support, and maintain a system of free public schools for the
state. 3 1 Taxation was the mechanism selected to finance the state's public
schools. 32 Article X, section 2 of the 1845 Constitution required the legislature to allocate at least ten percent of the total revenues generated through
33
state property taxes to the establishment of a perpetual public school fund.
Once again, the state legislature ignored the constitutional requirement, and
no "perpetual fund" was forthcoming until 1854.34 In fact, the initial de35
posit into the permanent endowment did not even come from tax revenues.
Rather, the first money invested in the permanent school fund was supplied
by an act of the United States Congress.3 6 Through this legislation, Texas
received a $2 million recovery stemming from a boundary dispute with New
Mexico.3 7 However, almost as soon as the special school fund was created,
28. "Between 1839 and 1840 the Republic of Texas had granted 4,209,413 acres of land to
support its educational system. The funds secured from the sale and lease of these lands were
given to the counties unconditionally, with Congress retaining no supervisory powers over the
money." Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 777. See also TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 2, interp.
commentary 379 (Vernon 1955).
29. "There was no evidence that any county in early times used its lands for the establishment of schools." F. STEWART & J. CLARK, supra note 25, at 103. See also C. FUNKHOUSER,
supra note 14, at 146 ("The only school established by the land grant policy adopted by the
Texas congress of 1839-40 was the semi-public San Augustine University.").
30. TEX. CONST. of 1845. See also Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 776 n.19.
31. "A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the rights and
liberties of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of this State to make suitable
provision for the support and maintenance of public schools." TEX. CONST. of 1845, art X,

§ 1.

32. "Special acts were passed by the legislature authorizing the following cities and counties to levy taxes for the support of free schools: Galveston (1846); Corpus Christi (1846); and
the County of Galveston (1848). In 1847 Galveston launched the first municipal public school
supported by taxation." C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 147.
33. The legislature shall, as early as practicable, establish free schools throughout
the State, and shall furnish means for their support, by taxation on property;
and it shall be the duty of the Legislature to set apart not less than one-tenth of
the annual revenue of the State derivable from taxation, as a perpetual fund,
which fund shall be appropriated to the support of free public schools; and no
law shall ever be made diverting said fund to any other use; and until such time
as the Legislature shall provide for the establishment of such schools, in the
several districts of the State, the fund thus created shall remain as a charge
against the State, passed to the credit of the free common-school fund.
TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. X, § 2. See also Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 778.
34. "Every governor of the state during this period insisted that the Legislature should
establish a system of schools, but nothing was done until 1854." See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra
note 14, at 147.
35. See Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 778.
36. Id.
37.

T. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR - A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 303 (1968).
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the Texas Legislature loaned the funds to the railroads. 38
Texas seceded from the Union in 1861, and the first confederate constitution was adopted in that year.3 9 The education article included in the 1861
Constitution mirrored almost exactly the earlier provisionA0 However, serious economic problems stemming from the state's involvement in the Civil
War prevented the railroads from repaying loans taken from the school
fund.4 1 In turn, the state was unable to continue disbursing money to the
schools.42 By the end of the Civil War, the permanent school fund was completely devoid of funds. 43 In fact, between 1861 and 1865 no funds were
disbursed for the support of the state's schools. 44
Learning from past mistakes, the framers of the 1866 Constitution limited
the legislature's control over the new permanent school fund.4 5 The Reconstruction constitution included a detailed education provision and required
that new lands be allocated to a new permanent school fund. 6 However, the
federal government nullified the 1866 Constitution, 47 and it was not until
1869 that the state finally adopted a constitution acceptable to the United
States government.48 The invalidation of the Reconstruction constitution
and the need to promulgate a new constitution for the state may explain why
38.

In the election of 1853, the need for schools and railroads was the paramount
issue. Elisha M. Pease's gubernatorial platform called on the legislature to set
apart $2,000,000 of United States Bonds for a "Special School Fund" and that
this be loaned for the building of railroads. Pease's election by an overwhelming
vote insured action.
C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 148. See also JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION
OF 1861, at 160 (1912):
By an act of the legislature of date January 31st, 1854, two million of the United
States five per cent bonds were set aside as a fund for the support of free schools,
the bonds to be loaned to railroads and the interest accruing to be distributed
among the counties. By another act the one-tenth of the revenue which had
previously accrued, and were afterwards to accrue, were required also to be invested in the five per cent bonds and loaned in the same manner. Other acts
required the proceeds arising from the sale of the public domain to be added to
the school fund.
Id.
39. TEX. CONST. of 1861.
40. TEX. CONST. of 1861, art. X.
41. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 149.

42.

In 1864, the railroads successfully lobbied the Legislature to be allowed to
use worthless Confederate treasury warrants to pay a large portion of the $1
million in interest the state owed on the $2 million borrowed from the permanent school fund between 1858 and 1861. By the end of the Civil War, the funds
gained from the New Mexico land settlement were practically gone. Repudiation also "prevented the state from repaying $1,137,406 that it had borrowed"
from the permanent school fund.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting C. MONEYHON, REPUBLICANISM IN RECONSTRUCTION
TEXAS 39 (1980)).
43. See C. MONEYHON, supra note 42, at 17.
44. F. STEWART & J. CLARK, supra note 25, at 104.
45. "The Legislature shall have no power to appropriate or loan or invest except as follows, any part of the principal sum of the perpetual school fund for any purpose whatever
...." TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. X, § 5.
46. TEx. CONST. of 1866, art. X, § 3 (provision setting aside lands for the permanent
school fund).
47. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 149.
48. Id. at 149-50.
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no funds were disbursed to the schools until 1870.49
The 1869 Constitution was Texas's fifth constitution in 33 years. 50 Article
IX, section 1 of the constitution provided that "[i]t shall be the duty of the
Legislature of this State, to make suitable provisions for the support and
maintenance of a system of public free schools, for the gratuitous instruction
of all the inhabitants of this State, between the ages of six and eighteen
years." 51 In order to meet the constitutional requirements, Governor Davis's administration created a highly centralized system of government that
spent extravagantly. 52 The new school law enacted by the legislature in
1871 centralized control of the state's public schools under a state superintendent. 5 3 The centralized system of education contributed heavily to the
54
government's increasing expenditures and, although taxes were increased,
55
the state sunk further and further into debt. In 1871, funds for public
of the permanent fund, poll taxes, general taxes,
schools were a combination
56
taxes.
local
and
In response to the almost militaristic rule imposed by Governor Davis and
the Radical Republicans, a taxpayers' convention was called in 1871 which
resulted in the Democrats regaining control of the legislature in 1872. 57 The
new legislature quickly returned control of the public schools to the local
authorities.58 However, by 1875 the Democrats concluded that, in order to
remedy the evils of the Davis administration and the 1869 Constitution, a
necessary. As a result, a constitutional convennew state constitution was
59
tion convened in 1875.
The convention resulted in the adoption of the eighth and final Texas
49. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
50. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 150. The convention called to promulgate the
new constitution was led by a group of Radical Republicans. T. FEHRENBACH, supra note 37,
at 411. In addition, E. J. Davis, a radical republican, was elected governor and was supported
further by the election of a radical legislature. W. BENTON, TEXAS POLITICS -CONSTRAINTS
AND OPPORTUNITIES 18 (5th ed. 1984).
51. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 1.
52. See Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 782.
53. Act approved Apr. 24, 1871, 12th Leg., R.S., ch. 56, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 57, 6 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 959-62 (1898). See also T. FEHRENBACH, supra note 37, at 419
(discussing how the control of education was taken completely from the public).
54. "In 1866, the legislature levied an ad valorem tax of $.225 per hundred dollars and a
$1 poll tax to finance state government. By 1871, that tax burden increased to $2.175 per one
hundred dollar valuation, with a $2 poll tax." Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 782 n.60
(citing T. FEHRENBACH, supra note 37, at 419).
55. "Davis estimated in 1871 that the cost of schools would be $5.38 million. Davis calculated that in 1871, the entire assets of the school fund constituted $2.5 million." Watts &
Rockwell, supra note 18, at 783 n.60.
56. Public schools were financed through "(1) the income from the permanent fund; (2)
one-fourth of the annual revenues from general taxation; (3) a poll tax from every voter between twenty-one and sixty years of age; and (4) local taxation sufficient to provide schoolhouses." F. STEWART & J. CLARK, supra note 25, at 105. The system "proved outrageously
extravagant. In four years it heaped up a debt of over a million dollars, which was ruinous to a
state so recently impoverished by war." C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 150.
57. See Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 783-84.
58. Id. at 784.
59. Id.
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Constitution. 60 Article VII, section 1 of the 1876 constitution is indicative
of the delegates' commitment to the state's educational system. The article
placed primary responsibility for establishing, maintaining, and supporting a
system of public schools on the state legislature. 61 However, since the state
suffered from a massive Reconstruction debt in 1876, it lacked the financial
62
capacity to achieve the high ideals announced in the education provision.
Although property taxes steadily increased, the state continued to experience
budget deficits. 63 Section l's scheme was intended to tax all citizens equally
through a statewide system of taxation. 64 However, recognizing the onerous
tax burdens already imposed on the state's citizens, the delegates included
Article VII, section 3 to restrict the legislature's ability to levy new taxes on
the overtaxed population. 65 The 1876 constitution did not enable local districts to tax for the support of the public schools. 66 Rather, Article VII,
section 5 required revenues generated through state taxes to be put into a
state-controlled school fund that would be "distributed to the several counties according to their scholastic population."'67 To implement this constitutional requirement, the 1876 convention enacted a statute which required
that state funds be disbursed to the schools on a per capita basis. 6 8 Theredecentralized,
fore, while the administration of public schools was extremely
69
school financing remained primarily a state concern.
Incorporated cities were an exception to the general ban on local taxation.
In fact, incorporated cities were the only local entities with authority to levy
local taxes to supplement the funds provided by the state government. 70 Ar60. TEX. CONST.
61. "A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties
and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of free public
schools." TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. "The purpose of this section as written was not only to
recognize the inherent power in the Legislature to establish an educational system for the state,
but also to make it the manadatory (sic) duty of that department to do so." Mumme v. Marrs,
120 Tex. 383, 395, 40 S.W.2d 31, 35 (1931).
62. E. MILLER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 191-96 (1916). See also Watts &
Rockwell, supra note 18, at 796 (suggesting that delegates to 1875 convention intended to
impose a prospective duty on future legislatures to comply with the requirements of Article
VII, § 1).
63. See Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 795.
64. TEX. CONST. art. VII,

§

1 (1876, amended 1989).

65. "There shall be set apart annually not more than one-fourth of the general revenue of
the State, and a poll tax of one dollar on all male inhabitants in this state between the ages of
twenty-one and sixty years, for the benefit of the public free schools." TEX. CONST. art. VII,

§ 3.

66. TEX. CONST. of 1876.
67. TEX. CONST. art. VII,

§ 5.
68. Law approved Aug. 19, 1876, 15th Leg., R.S., ch. 120, §§ 1, 15, 1876 Tex. Gen. Laws
199, 201, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1035, 1037 (1898).
69. The 1876 constitution provided for the creation of cities rather than school districts
and the Texas Supreme Court, in City of Fort Worth v. Davis, 57 Tex. 225 (1882), concluded
that the framers of the constitution did not intend for the local districts to have taxing authority. See Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, 807-08.
70. In Davis, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that Article XI, § 10 was an exception
to the general prohibition against local taxation. Section 10, according to the court, allowed
cities that were already taxing under their local charters to continue to do so. TEX. CONST.
art. XI, § 10 (1876, repealed 1969); Davis, 57 Tex. at 233-34.
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ticle XI, section 10's exception resulted in marked differences between the
rural and urban areas' ability to subsidize public education. 7 1 Many felt that
rural areas should be given the same opportunity as the incorporated cities
to subsidize education.

72

By 1879 it was clear that the state could no longer provide sufficient funding for state schools. 73 The legislature responded to Governor Robert's veto
of the 1879 school appropriations bill by decreasing the schools' portion of
state revenues from one-fourth to one-sixth. 74 In an attempt to increase revenues without raising taxes, the legislature passed a bill in 1879 that allowed
75

for the sale of state lands that had been held in trust for the state schools.
However, most of the land was sold or leased at far below market value and,
as a result, the funds raised fell far short of the money needed to properly

finance the state's educational system. 76 The continued economic depres-

sion, coupled with severe mismanagement of state funds, sunk the state fur77
ther into debt.

By 1883 it was clear that additional taxes were necessary to meet the
state's financial obligations. 78 Governor Roberts strongly opposed a state-

wide increase in taxes. 79 Instead, he advocated an amendment to Article
VII, section 3 which would allow all school districts to levy local taxes for
the support of public schools.80 In response to the governor's suggestions, a
joint resolution proposing changes to section 3 passed the House and Senate
and was ratified by the people in 1883.81 The amendment authorized the
school districts to levy local ad valorem taxes for the support of public
schools. 82 Needless to say, the state came increasingly to rely on the reve71. See Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 809.
72. Id. at 810, 813.
73. Id. at 810.
74. F. EBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN TEXAS 175 (1925).
75. Act approved July 14, 1879, 16th Leg., C.S., ch. 52, 1879 Tex. Gen. Laws 48, 9 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 80 (1898) amended by Act approved Apr. 6, 1881, 17th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 105, 1881 Tex. Gen. Laws 119, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 211-14 (1898). See also
Watts & Rockwell, supra note 17, at 811.
76. See Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 811.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 812.
79. Id. at 813.
80. Id.
81. Tex. S.J. Res. 5, 18th Leg., R.S., 1883 Tex. Gen. Laws 134, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 440 (1898). See also Returns of an election held on the 14th day of August 1883, upon
the adoption or rejection of Amendments to the Constitution of the state of Texas, Secretary of
State, Report of the Secretary of State for the State of Texas (1884).
82. One-fourth of the revenue derived from the State occupation taxes and poll tax
of one dollar on every inhabitant of the State, between the ages of twenty-one
and sixty years, shall be set apart annually for the benefit of the public free
schools; ... and it shall be the duty of the State Board of Education to set aside
a sufficient amount out of the said tax to provide free text books for the use of
children attending the public free schools of this State; provided, however, that
should the limit of taxation herein named be insufficient the deficit may be met
by appropriation from the general funds of the State and the Legislature may
also provide for the information of school district (sic) by general laws; and all
such school districts may embrace parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes
in all said districts and for the management and control of the public school or
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nues generated through local property taxes to support the system of free
83
public schools.
The 1883 amendment was the first of many constitutional amendments,
approximately fifteen of which involved state taxation.8 4 Social and economic changes taking place in the state required that the constitution be
amended more closely to reflect the state's varying needs. Nevertheless, the
revenue-raising ability of school districts continued to be unequal. Industrialization, urbanization, and the discovery of oil made matters worse by fur-

ther concentrating the state's property wealth in certain districts.85 Despite
the problems generated by taxation based on local property wealth, it be-

came clear that local taxation was essential if the state's schools were to be
maintained.
R

CurrentSystem of EducationalFinancingin Texas

Although the administration and financing of public schools is generally
seen as a local concern, educational funding has in fact for some time been a
combined effort of both the state and local governments. 86 The shared fi-

nancing responsibility has been justified on a number of grounds. First,
states have recognized the need to establish a certain minimum level of educational opportunity and quality.8 7 In order to insure that basic state standards are met and imposed on a uniform basis, state governments have
schools of such districts, whether such districts are composed of territory wholly
within a county or in parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature may
authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all
school districts heretofore or hereafter formed, for the further maintenance of
public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school buildings
therein; provided that a majority of the qualified property taxpaying voters of
the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose, shall vote such tax
not to exceed in any one year one ($1.00) dollar on the one hundred dollars
valuation of the property subject to taxation in such district, but the limitation
upon the amount of school district tax herein authorized shall not apply to incorporated cities or towns constituting separate and independent school districts, nor to independent or common school districts created by general or
special law.
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1876, amended 1883 and thereafter).
83. C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 154.
84. Id. For example, an amendment in 1908 raised the earlier imposed limit on taxes
from twenty to fifty cents per $100 valuation. Id. at 153.
85. In 1946, for example, property values in some sixty-six counties accounted for
68.2 per cent of the total assessed valuation for the entire state.... Some 36 of
the 66 counties mentioned above are major oil-producing areas, and alone supplied 42.2 per cent of the state's taxable property in 1946 ....
[I]t is definitely
known that petroleum resources in those jurisdictions are responsible directly
for most of the wealth, and consequently make up a major segment of present
taxable value[s]. Property in [the twenty-six counties having the highest annual
petroleum production records in 1946] accounted for 23.5 per cent of the state's
valuation in 1932. In 1946, property values in the same counties accounted for
35.1 per cent of the state's total assessed valuation, an increase of almost 12% in
fifteen years.
L. ANDERSEN, THE STATE PROPERTY TAX IN TEXAS 86-87 (1948).

86. Anderson, School FinanceLitigation - The Styles of JudicialIntervention, 55 WASH. L.
REV. 137, 137 (1979).
87. Id. at 138.
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become involved in the realm of public school education.,, State involvement in education is visible in a number of ways. For example, state governments regulate matters such as the required length of school years, teacher
certification requirements, curriculum requirements, and textbook selection.89 Second, state governmental involvement with local services is in-

tended to prevent unfairness in the local funding process. 90 Inequities are all
but inevitable when educational funding is based on taxation of local property. 9' Since certain districts maintain higher taxable property wealth than
others, an educational funding system which relies completely on local subsidies will necessarily discriminate against those districts with less property
wealth. 92 Recognizing this problem, most states have attempted to avoid
93
such inequities through state subsidies.
State aid has generally taken the form of "equalization" grants from states
to local school districts. 94 The equalization grants are designed to alleviate
the considerable disparities in taxable wealth between districts and the resulting inability of property-poor districts to generate revenues equivalent to
those raised by property-rich districts. 95 States' attempts, through the use of
equalization grants, to correct the inequalities engendered by the system of
local taxation have failed. 96 Their failure is clearly demonstrated by the considerable disparities in per pupil expenditures that persist in most
97
jurisdictions.
By the late 1940s, the mounting costs of state services in Texas9 8 and the
unequal tax burdens imposed on school districts9 9 made it clear that fundamental change in the structure of the taxing authority was essential.1°° The
Gilmer-Aikin laws, which reinforced the dual system of state and local educational funding, were enacted in 1949.101

Through this legislation the

Foundation School Program was established.10 2 The current program has
been characterized as a three-tiered system: the Foundation School Program, the Guaranteed Yield Program, and enrichment through local prop88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Unequal spending due to disparities in local taxable property wealth is not peculiar to
educational financing. The problems effect other locally funded public services such as police
and fire services. However, disparities in educational spending have tended to receive heightened attention. Anderson, supra note 86, at 139.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Anderson, supra note 86, at 139-40.
97. See supra note 13.
98. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 157.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Foundation School Program, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 334, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 625.
102. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 1991). The Gilmer-Aikin laws also vested
the authority over public school in the Central Education Agency. The CEA is comprised of
the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, and the State Department of
Education. See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 157.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

erty taxes.' 0 3 The program's primary purpose is to remedy the problems
associated with the school districts' varying abilities to generate revenues to
subsidize public schools.' ° 4 Recognizing that property-poor districts were
disadvantaged by the concentration of the state's property wealth in certain
areas, the legislature attempted to assist the poorer districts in generating
revenues to support their schools. 0 5 Rather than continuing to distribute
funds on a per capita basis, the new system allocates funds according to an
economic index.1°6 Through the use of a complex formula, the state measures a particular district's ability to raise revenues and then allocates more
07
state aid to property-poor districts than to property-rich districts.
The Foundation School Program has not been the only source of state aid
to public schools. The Permanent School Fund continues to provide a significant portion of state funding. 0 8 However, even the combined efforts of
the Foundation Program and the Permanent Fund have been unable to fully

remedy the problems faced by poor school districts. 109 The Educational Op103. "A guaranteed yield means that for every penny of tax effort per $100 of value over
and above that required to raise the LFA [local fund assignment], the state guarantees an equal
yield per district up to a specific amount." Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, No.
362516, at 4 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept 24, 1990),judgment vacated in part, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
104. C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 157.
105. Id.
106. "The new system abolished the traditional per capita system of distributing state
funds and in its place adopted a plan based upon the 'economic index'." The economic index
determines a school district's taxpaying ability in relation to other districts in the state. The
Education Code initially provided:
(b) The economic index for each county shall be based upon and determined
by the following weighted factors:
(1) assessed property valuation of the county, weighted by twenty;
(2) scholastic population of the county, weighted by eight; and
(3) income for the county as measured by value added by manufacture,
value of minerals produced, value of agricultural products, payrolls for retail
establishments, payrolls for wholesale establishments, and payrolls for service
establishments, all weighted collectively by seventy-two.
Foundation School Program, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 334, art. VI, § 3, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 625,
639, amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch 334, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 877.
For the current law that adjusts school fund allotments on the basis of an index see TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.102 (Vernon 1991).
107. Id. But see Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989)
[hereinafter Edgewood I] ("There are no Foundation School Program allotments for school
facilities or for debt service. The basic allotment and the transportation allotment understate
actual costs, and the career ladder salary supplement for teachers is underfunded. For these
reasons and more, almost all school districts spend additional local funds.").
108. The Permanent School Fund now provides a total of $533 million a year, or
$226 per child, to local school district. Ten years ago, it provided just $33 per
child, indicating the potential of growth of the Fund ....
[The fund] has a
current market value of $7.7 billion.... The rate of return on investments from
the Fund has grown from 3.4 percent in 1961 to 9.2 percent, and annual income
from investments has grown from $13.8 million to $533 million ....
If left intact, the Fund over the next 10 years will provide local school districts with $6.7
billion.
C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 25-26.
109. [A]id to public schools under the Foundation School Program totaled $3.6
billion. That figure increased to $4.5 billion in the 1984-85 school year and to
approximately $4.6 billion in 1985-86. State aid per student in average daily
attendance (ADA) increased significantly during the same period, from $1,315
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portunity Act of 1984 (House Bill 72)110 was enacted to address the persistent problems resulting from the inequitable concentration of property
wealth throughout the state. The Texas Education Agency's Biennial Report for 1984-1986 indicated that the poorest districts were receiving consid-

erably higher percentages of state funds than were the wealthiest districts. I1

Nevertheless, despite continual state funding, the Texas school financing sys-

tem continues to show marked disparities between districts in per pupil
112
expenditures.
As a result of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Edgewood 1,113 the
Texas Legislature adopted Senate Bill 1 again to restructure the Texas
school financing system. 114 However, on January 22, 1991, the Texas

Supreme Court held Senate Bill 1 unconstitutional because, in its view, the
bill failed to remedy the extreme disparities in per pupil expenditures between school districts.' 1 5 Again, the Texas Legislature, working under a

judicially-imposed time limit, adopted another financing system to remedy

the problems outlined by the Texas courts. 116 Although the district court

has found the latest system to be constitutionally permissible, its validity is
currently being challenged by the property-rich school districts. 117 Clearly,

the problems associated with public school financing remain unresolved.
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Texas is not the only state whose courts have been faced with school financing litigation. Cases attacking the constitutionality of state educational
funding programs have appeared in most jurisdictions."18 However, state
court decisions in these cases have varied such that no uniform principle can
be applied to recently instituted public school financing litigation." 9 In orper ADA in 1983-84 to $1,560 in 1984-85, $1,571 in 1985-86 and $1,579 in
1986-87.
Id. at 24.
110. Act of Sept. 1, 1984, 68th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 28, art. 2, 1984 Tex. Gen. Laws 117, 131.
See also C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 24.

State aid to the poorest school districts in the state - those with average property wealth of $94,000 or less per student - [h]as increased by an average of more
than 56 percent, or $849 per ADA from 1983-84 to 1985-86. State aid accounted for more than 70 percent of the total revenue of these poorer school
districts. The state's wealthiest districts, however, received just less than 10 percent of their total revenues from state sources.
See C. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 14, at 24-25. "For the poorest group of districts, the state
pays 92.1% of the foundation cost, or $2,212 per student. For the most affluent group, the
state's share was 16.6%, or $332 per student." Id. at 41.
112. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
113. Id.
114. Act of June 7, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1.
115. 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991).
116. Edgewood 11at 39. Act of April 11, 1991, ch. 20, §§ 16.001-21.930, 1991 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 20 (Vernon).
117. Judge OKs Texas School Finance Law, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 8, 1991, at IA,
col. .
118. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
119. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of
11 .
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der to determine the appropriate judicial response, a review of different
states' approaches to such litigation is appropriate.
Serrano v. Priest120 was one of the first cases to consider the constitutionality of a state's system of public school financing. In that case, parents and
schoolchildren brought suit in California state court claiming the system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The
challenge to the legislatively imposed program was based on the assertion
that the considerable disparities in per pupil expenditures found between
school districts violated the federal constitution's assurance of equal protection under the laws. 12' Relying on a "fiscal neutrality" theory, 122 the California Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection requirement was violated when the level of educational spending
depended on the relative wealth of the district.123
Although the Serrano decision was the first in a long line of public school
financing litigation, the decision was not appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.' 2 4 While the California decision was on remand, however,
a similar case was brought in the federal courts. The plaintiffs in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 12 5 brought a class action
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas system of public school financing. Once again, the constitutional claim was based on the disparities in per
pupil spending found among school districts. 26 A three-judge court held
the Texas Legislature's educational financing program invalid because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 27 The
United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the lower court's
equal protection analysis. 2 8 In reversing the district court, the Supreme
Court concluded that, for the purposes of an equal protection analysis, education was not a fundamental right 129 and wealth did not constitute a susEduc., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 472, 303 A.2d 273 (1973);
Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d
813 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
120. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), aff'd on remand, 18 Cal. 3d
728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
121. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244.
122. The California court rejected the educational needs standard announced in McKinnis
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969), and instead adopted a fiscal neutrality theory. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 940.
The fiscal neutrality principle, as described by the Edgewood court, demands neutrality in the
sense that "the level of expenditures per pupil in any district may not vary according to the
property wealth of that district." Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 761 S.W.2d 859,
860 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989).
123. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 953.
124. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of additional evidence. 487 P.2d at 1266.
125. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
126. Id. at 11-13.
127. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 286 (W.D. Tex.
1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
128. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18.
129. The Court emphasized that the federal constitution did not explicitly mention the
right to education. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that education rises to the
level of a fundamental right because it is necessary to exercise other fundamental rights such as
the right to vote. Id. at 35-37.
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pect class. 130 As a result, the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred
in using the stricter degree of judicial scrutiny traditionally reserved for
cases involving fundamental rights or suspect classes.' 3 The Court found
that the state, rather than having to demonstrate a compelling state interest

in the funding program, was only required to show a rational relationship
between the statute and a legitimate state objective.13 2 The Court held that
the state had satisfied this burden. 133 Additionally, the Court rejected the

fiscal neutrality argument announced in Serrano.134 The Court's decision

was based partly on (1) its conclusion that equal spending among school

districts did not necessarily ensure equal access to educational opportunities, 135 and (2) the considerably complex issues involved in educational fi-

nancing.136 Recognizing further that any attempt to equalize per pupil
spending would necessarily involve either an increase in taxes or the reallocation of existing state funds, the Supreme Court emphasized that such ac-

tions were traditionally exercised by the legislative branch.

37

According to

130. The Court concluded that the education system did not discriminate against any definable class of poor people. In addition, the system did not result in a complete deprivation of
the right to education. Id. at 28.
131. Id. at 40.
132. "A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that
the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes."

Id.
133. Satisfying the rational relationship test is considerably easier for a state than having
the burden of proof under the strict scrutiny test. In the latter, the state must show a compelling state objective as well as a close fit between the objective and the means chosen to attain it.
The rational relationship test, on the other hand, only requires the state to show a legitimate
state objective and that the means chosen are rationally related to its attainment.
134. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 940. See also Note, Judicial Control of the Purse - Finance Litigation in State Courts, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1393, 1398-99 (1982).
135. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43.
136. "The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public
school system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of
solving them,' and that, within the limits of rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to tackle the
problems' should be entitled to respect." Id. at 42 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 546-47 (1972)). The Court stated further:
It cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the District
Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today would occasion in Texas
and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in public education ....
But, just as
there is nothing simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases,
there is nothing simple or certain about predicting the consequences of massive
change in the financing and control of public education. Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of these cases
have found no clear or dependable answers and their scholarship reflects no
such unqualified confidence in the desirability of completely uprooting the existing system.
The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by the lack of consensus.
with respect to whether it may be said with any assurance that the poor, the
racial minorities, or the children in overburdened core-city school districts
would be benefitted by abrogation of traditional modes of financing education.
Id. at 56.
137. The court noted that these considerations:
serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to
state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of
the various states, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separa-
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current school financing system were
the Court, the problems inherent in the
13 8
not suited to judicial determination.

Since the Rodriguez 139 decision seemed to foreclose any possibility of invalidating state educational financing programs on federal equal protection
grounds, 140 disgruntled citizens who were determined to invalidate their
school financing programs were well-advised to adopt another theory. Most
plaintiffs who have attacked their educational financing programs since the
Rodriguez decision have attempted to do so through the use of state constitutional provisions requiring an efficient, uniform, or thorough system of public school education.14 1 A court faced with such a case has essentially three
alternatives: the court can find the funding system unconstitutional and be

prepared to enforce its decision or suffer a loss in credibility; the court can
hold the state's financing system to be constitutional; or the court can hold
the issue to be nonjusticiable.142 State courts have chosen differing routes,
and this section will present examples from each category.

A. Invalidate the FinancingSystem
In 1973 the New Jersey Supreme Court, resorting to a little known provision of the state constitution requiring a "thorough and uniform" system of

public schools, held its system of public school financing unconstitutional. 143
In Robinson v. Cahil1144 the trial court concluded that the state legislature's
system for funding public schools was invalid because it failed to provide the
tion of powers by staying our hand.... The ultimate solutions must come from
the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.
Id. at 58-59. The Court also implicitly recognized the judiciary's right to play a more active
role in desegregation cases. However, the Court pointed out that the Rodriguez case did not
involve issues of desegregation. As noted in the opinion, the San Antonio Independent School
District was well above the average in taxable wealth per pupil and has a student population
that is 72% Mexican-American. See id. at 57-58 n.113; Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651,
109 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1990) (judicially-imposed tax increase was appropriate in order to fund
desegregation program).
138. "It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogatives of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits
thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which
citizens live." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. By relying on a state constitutional provision, state courts are able to avoid review by
the United States Supreme Court. This is preferable especially in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion, articulated in the Rodriguez decision, that equalizing per pupil expenditures does not
necessarily ensure equal educational opportunities. 411 U.S. at 43.
142. P. STRUMM, THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL EVASION 5 (1974).
143. Although the plaintiffs argued that the financing system was unconstitutional because
it violated the federal equal protection clause, the state equal protection clause, and the state
constitutional guarantee of a "thorough and uniform" system of public schools, the trial
court's decision rested solely on the plaintiffs' final argument. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,
303 A.2d 273, 282, 286, 295 (1973). The court concluded that since New Jersey had adopted
the same equal protection analysis for the state constitution that the United States Supreme
Court used with respect to the federal constitution, the state equal protection claim logically
must fail. Id. at 279.
144. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) [hereinafter Robinson I].
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state with an efficient system of public schools. 4 5 The New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's decision but stayed any imposition of judicial
relief until January 1, 1974, in order to give the state legislature the opportunity to devise a new plan.' 46 Nevertheless, the supreme court concluded
that, should the legislature fail to adopt such a plan, state funds were to be
appropriated in accordance with the trial court's opinion rather than accord47
ing to the statute's terms.1
The New Jersey Legislature failed to meet the deadline set by the state's
supreme court. 48 Faced with outright defiance, the court considered various methods by which to force the legislature to comply with the judicial
mandate. 149 Because few favorable alternatives existed, the court, in May
1975, enjoined the state treasury from disbursing state funds except in accordance with the earlier Robinson opinion. 150 The court's actions finally
prompted a legislative response. In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court
approved the legislature's new program for the financing of New Jersey public schools. 15 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision is not unique.
Since Robinson, a number of state courts have held that their public school
52
financing programs violate state constitutional requirements.1
B. Uphold the FinancingSystem
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of the City
School District of Cincinnativ. Walter 153 is an example of the second alter-

native available to courts.' 54 Once again, opponents of the state's educational financing program argued that disparities in per pupil expenditures
violated the state constitutional guarantee of a "thorough and uniform" system of public schools. In this case, however, the Ohio Supreme Court found
145. Empirical data cited in the court's opinion showed that at the time of the case 67% of
the public school funds came from local ad valorem taxes, 28% came from state funds, and
5% was attributable to federal aid. Id. at 276. The court did, however, reject the argument

that taxation by local school districts was inherently unconstitutional. Id. at 287-295. See also
Rose, Seizing the Pursestrings: Urban Policy by Judicial Fiat,IV BENCHMARK 5 (1988).
146. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 298. See also Rose, supra note 145, at 5 ("... the court gave
the legislature a choice of two ways to comply with the new constitutional mandate: the State
could finance public education on a Statewide basis, or the State could compel local school
districts to raise the necessary money to provide an equal educational opportunity for its
school children.")
147. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 298.
148. See Rose, supra note 145, at 9 (suggesting that legislative inaction constituted a deliberate challenge to the judiciary rather than inability to reach a legislative solution).
149. Id. at 10.
150. 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
151. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976). See also Rose, supra note 145,
at 5 (1988) ("The decision was used to provide a political excuse for the legislature to blame
the court for increases in taxes to pay for the court-mandated increased funding for public
education.").
152. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Horton
v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585
P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Washakie County
School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
153. 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
154. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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that the system of educational financing was constitutionally permissible.' 55
The court concluded that since each child received an adequate education
under the current system, the program was not unconstitutional. 5 6 In considering the constitution's education provision,'7 the supreme court agreed
with the court of appeal's conclusion that a considerable degree of deference

was due the legislature's adoption of one program for public school financing
over another. 5 8 In this case, the court refused to invalidate the legislature's
system of financing public schools and, in doing so, declared that the issues
involved in public school financing were judicially cognizable. The court's
decision was strategic; it allowed the court to avoid the enforcement
problems faced by the New Jersey court in Robinson,'3 9 but at the same time
it preserved the court's right to reconsider the issue in the future.' 60
The Colorado Supreme Court in Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education '61 reached a similar decision. The court adopted the Rodriguez equal
protection analysis and concluded that the disparities that existed between
school districts in per pupil expenditures did not violate either the federal or
state constitutional guarantee to equal protection under the law.' 62 The
court then addressed the appellees' argument that the school financing system 63 violated the state constitution because it failed to provide a "thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state."' 164
The court emphasized that this provision did not require that the legisla155. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 825.
156. Id.
157. OHIO CONsT. art. VI, § 2 (1851).
158. "Because this constitutional grant reinforces the ordinary discretion reposed in the
General Assembly in its enactment of legislation, the judicial department of this state should
exercise great circumspection before declaring public school legislation unconstitutional as a
violation of Article VI, Section 2." Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 824. But note, the court rejects the
defendants' argument that the efficiency of a particular financing system is a political question.
Id. at 823.
159. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
160. For other cases holding school financing systems unconstitutional, see Shofstall v.
Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156
(1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57
N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dism'd, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983);
Fair School Finance Council of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v.
State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979);
Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470 (1988).
161. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
162. In rejecting the argument that education constitutes a fundamental right, the court
stated:
[w]e refuse, however, to venture into the realm of social policy under the guise
that there is a fundamental right to education which calls upon us to find that
equal educational opportunity requires equal expenditures for each school
child .... [A] review of the record and case law shows that courts are ill-suited to
determine what equal educational opportunity is, especially since fundamental
disagreement exists concerning the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education.
Id. at 1018.
163. In 1977, 47% of Colorado's public school funds were raised through local ad valorem
taxes. The balance of the expenses were made up through state funds (43%), federal aid (6%),
and other miscellaneous sources (4%). Id.
164. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1876). "Appellees' argument is... that the present sys-
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ture's funding program result in equal expenditures across the districts.' 65
The opinion also expressed the court's belief that the determination of an
appropriate system for financing of public schools was the legislature's
responsibility.166
C

Validity of FinancingSystem Nonjusticiable

The court in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board ofEducation 167 adopted
the final alternative, and held the public school financing issue nonjusticiable.16s The court found that the constitutional provision requiring the legislature to create a thorough and efficient system of public schools did not
require identical per pupil expenditures in each school district. 169 The
court's opinion is best read as an implicit acceptance of the applicability of
the political question doctrine in the area of public school financing. 7 0° Specifically, the court stated:
The expostulations of those urging alleviation of the existing disparities are properly to be addressed to the legislature for its consideration
and weighing in the discharge of its continuing obligation to provide a
thorough and efficient statewide system of free public schools. Otherwise stated, it is not within the power or province of members of the
Judiciary to advance their own personal notions of fairness under the
guise of constitutional interpretation.
The quantity and quality of educational opportunities to be made
available to the State's public school children is a determination committed to the legislature or to the people of Maryland through
adoption
7
of an appropriate amendment to the State Constitution.' '
Finding judicial determination of the issue inappropriate, the Maryland
172
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision.
Likewise, Justice Shepard's concurring opinion in Thompson v. Engelking 7 3 argued that the appropriate system of public school financing constituted a political question. ' 74 Justice Shepard discussed in great detail the
pros and cons associated with alternative methods of funding a system of
tern violates this mandate by creating varying educational opportunities due to revenue differences between the districts." Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1024.
165. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025.

166.

While it is clearly the province and duty of the judiciary to determine what
the law is, the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing elementary and

secondary public education in Colorado is not only the proper function of the
General Assembly, but this function is expressly mandated by the Colorado
Constitution. Thus, whether a better financing system could be devised is not
material to this decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of
our state's system.

Id.
167. 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
168. Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 790.

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.

173. 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975).
174. "I suggest that the answers to such questions must come from the legislative branch of
government." Id. at 657.
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public schools. 175 His concurring opinion does an excellent job of highlighting the complexity of the many trade-offs involved in selecting an appropriate system.176 His examination of the available alternatives led inevitably to
his ultimate conclusion that the selection of the appropriate financing system
177
required legislative expertise.

D. The Texas Case
Texas has now joined the long list of states that have found their public
school financing system unconstitutional. 78 In Edgewood 1179 suit was
brought seeking a declaration that the current public school financing program' 80 was unconstitutional.1 81 Evidence presented at the Edgewood I trial
showed the extreme disparities in funding between school districts in the San
Antonio area. The plaintiffs argued that the system failed to satisfy the constitution's efficiency requirement since a district's per pupil expenditures depended largely on the total property wealth of the district. 8 2 Additionally,
they emphasized that the poorer districts often had to impose higher than
18 3
average tax rates in order to meet minimum educational standards.
84
The district court found the legislature's program unconstitutional.
8
5
The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the proper disbursement of
public funds to create an efficient school system was a complex problem that
required legislative expertise. 18 6 More specifically, the court of appeals
found that the appropriate system of public school financing constituted a
political question and was thus beyond the court's power of judicial
7
review. 18
175. Id. at 655-57.
176. Id.
177. "I make no pretense of omniscience and concede that the resolution of socio-politicoeducational policy decisions lie outside the ambit of our constitutional authority and within

that of the legislature." 96 Idaho at 816, 537 P.2d at 658.
178. Edgewood 1,777 S.W.2d 391 (1989). See supra note 160.
179.

761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.App.-Austin, 1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989).

180. The current funding program is made up of a combination of state and local taxation.
At the time of suit, Texas public schools were financed in the following manner: 50% state
funding, 42% local ad valorem taxes, 8% federal funding. The legislature provides state aid

through the Foundation School Program to offset the inability of certain districts to generate
sufficient revenue to meet the state's minimum educational requirements. Id. at 861.
181. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.

182. The supreme court's opinion observed that the wealthiest school district had over $14
million of property wealth, while the poorest district had only $20,000 in property wealth. As

an example of the extreme disparities between districts, the court's opinion revealed that
Edgewood I.S.D. had approximately $38,854 in property wealth per student, whereas Alamo
Heights I.S.D. had approximately $570,109. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
183. "Generally, the property-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the propertypoor districts must tax high merely to spend low." Id. at 393.
184. 761 S.W.2d at 860.
185. Id. As in Robinson, the plaintiffs in this case also argued the program violated both
the state and federal equal protection clauses. However, they were unable to persuade the
court of appeals to ignore the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. Edgewood
1,761 S.W.2d at 861-67.
186. Id. at 867.
187.
That provision [Art. VII, sec. 1] does, of course, require that the school
system be "efficient," but the provision provides no guidance as to how this or
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In October 1989 the Texas Supreme Court considered the controversial
issues presented by the Texas public school financing system.' 88 The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' reading of the case and
reinstated the district court's holding.189 In finding the school financing program unconstitutional, the supreme court directed the Texas Legislature to
develop a new program for financing of public schools by May 1, 1990.190
Although the deadline came and went without any legislative action, the
legislature eventually did pass a new education act on June 5, 1990.191 However, in July 1990 the plaintiffs returned to the courts in Edgewood II to
demand enforcement of the earlier judgment. 192 The District Court for
Travis County, after considering Senate Bill 1, found the legislature's new
program for public school financing unconstitutional since it failed to remedy the problems with the earlier system.193 In its opinion, the district court
made clear that if an adequate solution were not forthcoming from the legislature, the court would take action on its own to enforce its judgment.194 On
January 22, 1991, the Texas Supreme Court issued an order to the Texas
Legislature to develop a new system for school financing by April 1, 1991.195
The court emphasized that, 'should the legislature fail to act, the judiciary
would take action to remedy the situation. 196 What such action would entail
is left to conjecture, but it seems clear that enforcement of the court's judgment would necessarily require either enjoining disbursement of state funds,
a judicially-imposed tax increase, or a court-ordered reallocation of state
funds. 197 The Texas courts have chosen to follow the path taken by the
any other court may arrive at a determination of what is efficient or inefficient.
Given the enormous complexity of a school system educating three million children, this Court concludes that which is, or is not, "efficient" is essentially a
political question not suitable for judicial review....

[U]nder our system of government, efforts to achieve those ideals come from
the people through constitutional amendments and legislative enactments and
not through judgments of courts.
Id. at 867.
188. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
189. Id. at 399.
190. Id.
191. Article 1 of Senate Bill I was signed by the Governor on June 7, 1990, and was expected to go into effect on September 1, 1990. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, No.
362516 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept. 24, 1990), judgment
vacated in part, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
192. Id.
193. The court rejected the state's argument that Senate Bill 1 should be given a chance to
prove itself and its merits. "The court finds no purpose in waiting to assess Senate Bill 1.
From what is known today, even assuming the best, the court confidently finds that Senate Bill
1 will not provide equity. Waiting from one to five years for the obvious to prove true only
postpones desperately needed reform." Id. at 7.
194. Id. at 40.
195. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991). For the latest developments in this
case, see supra note 12.
196. Id.
197. If there is no appropriate timely action taken by the legislature, the court may
order injunctive relief either by enjoining the distribution of any funds for the
schools, thereby effectively closing them, or by ordering the redistribution of
existing funds by a formula considered to be more equalizing. .

.

. A much

broader remedy would be a court order mandating the collection of revenue
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Robinson court and, as a result, they are now faced with the same enforcement problems confronted by the New Jersey courts.' 98
IV.

ANALYSIS

Clearly disputes arising out of disparities in per pupil expenditures are not
peculiar to the state of Texas. Many state financing systems have fostered
the same problems.' 99 The question thus remains, what can be done to remedy the inequities? A more relevant question for the purposes of this comment is, are the courts the appropriate forums for dealing with these
problems? After considering the alternatives available to a court faced with
public school financing litigation, it seems clear that the appropriate judicial
response is to invoke the political question doctrine. 20° Had the Texas
courts done so, they would not currently be faced with the complex
problems of enforcement. 20 A judicial determination that Texas' system of
public school financing is unconstitutional serves as a de facto order to the
state legislature to devise a new program of educational financing; it may
even amount to a judicial levying of taxes. 20 2 Distinguishing between a judicially imposed program and a judicial decision requiring the legislature to
adopt a new program is really a question of form over substance. The Texas
Supreme Court's determination that the educational financing scheme fails
to meet basic constitutional requirements necessarily requires the legislature
to either impose a tax increase or reallocate existing state funds. 203 Allowing
the court to demand such legislative action has serious repercussions in the
context of separation of powers because it allows the judiciary to intrude into
2 °4
an area that has traditionally been the exclusive realm of the legislature.
through local taxation.... Finally, the court may judicially define the amount of
money to be spent by the state on education and force the legislature to provide
new funds.
Note, supra note 134, at 1405 (footnotes omitted).
198. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 160.
200. The rule that the Court must legitimate whatever it is not justified in striking
down fails to attain its intended purpose of removing the court from the political
arena; rather it works an uncertain and uncontrolled change in the degree of the
Court's intervention, and it shifts the direction.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLI-

Tics 131 (2d ed. 1986).

201. See Note, supra note 134, at 1405.
202. As pointed out by one justice with respect to the Robinson decision, "[t]he court did
not say that you had to have an income tax, but anyone with an ounce of sense would know
that the only possible solution to the problem was the adoption of an income tax or something
much worse. . ." Note, supra note 134, at 1403 n.49 (quoting R. LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE 114 (1978)).
203. See supra note 202.
204. Since it has traditionally been thought that courts have no power over the
'sword or purse,' judicial allocation of money is thought to be an invasion of the
democratic process because it is the judiciary, usually unelected, rather than the

politically accountable branches, that is directing the allocation of government
funds. Federal and state constitutions vest the legislature with spending power
for an important reason - it is thought that only the most politically accountable
branch of government should have this decisive power.
Note, supra note 134, 1410-11.
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Because of the potentially far-reaching effects on the separation of powers
doctrine, it is appropriate to consider the applicability of the political question doctrine.
Although few state courts have applied the political question doctrine in
the education context, a review of the relevant case law suggests that the
doctrine is well-recognized by both federal and state courts. 20 5 While Texas
courts often invoke the doctrine to avoid judicial determination of disputes, 2°6 a satisfactory definition of the concept is absent from most state
court decisions. Since Justice Brennan's opinion in Baker v. Carr20 7 continues to be the seminal discussion of the factors constituting a nonjusticiable
political question, it will serve as the framework for this discussion. 20 8
According to Brennan, the first criterion a court should consider is
whether the function in question has been allocated to a particular branch of
government by the constitution. 20 9 Second, the court should determine
whether the constitution provides sufficiently identifiable standards for the
court to apply in resolving the issue. 210 Third, the court should ascertain
whether the decision calls for a choice between differing public policy considerations. 21' Fourth, the court should determine whether the situation is
such that there is a special need for the government to speak with one
voice. 2 12 Fifth, the court should consider whether there is a special need for
adherence to a decision already made. 2 13 Finally, the court should consider
whether a judicial decision would cause undue embarrassment or encourage
disrespect for another branch of government. 21 4
Applying the factors outlined above, it appears that the relative efficiency
of Texas' system of public school financing is a classic example of a political
question. Brennan's criteria are present in Edgewood I & II along with other
compelling reasons that the court should have avoided judicial resolution of
205. In particular, Texas recognized the existence of the political question doctrine in
School Bd. of Marshall v. State, 343 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. 1961) (court held that school

redistricting constituted political question).
206. Id.
207. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

208. Although this case arose in the federal courts, the use of the term by state courts
reflects many of the factors considered by the Court in Baker.
209. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of

the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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the problem. 215
Brennan's first criterion is met since the Texas Constitution explicitly delegates the authority for creating a system of public schools to the legislature.216 The legislature is also under an obligation to develop a program to
finance the public school system. 217 An examination of the framers' intent
at the time of the constitution's adoption confirms this delegation of
21
power. 8

Perhaps more important than the delegation of the educational power is
the Texas Constitution's explicit delegation of the taxing power to the legislature. 219 At the time of the ratification of the 1876 Constitution, taxation
220
for the purpose of supporting public schools was a controversial issue. It
was controversial, not because people rejected altogether the necessity of taxing for the support of public schools, but rather because the framers, as well
as the ratifiers, wanted to abolish the centralized system of education established by the 1869 Constitution. 221 As the amendment to Article VII, Section 3222 of the 1876 Constitution demonstrates, the people intended to
maintain local control over taxation. 223 The desire to monitor closely the
taxing power clearly indicates that the people wanted to keep the power to
215. See generally Anderson, supra note 86, at 137; Note, supra note 134.
216. "A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties
and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools." TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added). From the earliest state constitution
(1836), the Congress has been given the duty to provide an educational system for the state.
See generally Watts & Rockwell, supra note 18, at 777.
217. [T~he Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in all said districts, . . . and the Legislature may authorize an
additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts
heretofore formed or hereafter formed, for the further maintenance of public
free school.
TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1876, amended 1883) (emphasis added).
218. The Texas courts are committed to following not only the intent of the framers, but
also the intent of the constitution's ratifiers. Sears v. Bayoud, 786 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex.
1990); Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912). See generally Watts &
Rockwell, supra note 18, at 774 n. 14. See supra notes 57-69.
219. See supra note 82. The constitutional delegation of the taxing power becomes important in this analysis since any judicial action to resolve the great financial disparities inherent
in the present system of school financing will likely entail an increase in taxes.
220. Governor Davis's administration (1870-71) had been notorious for its outrageous
spending habits. Taxpayers upset about the extravagant spending organized a convention
which allowed the Democrats to regain control of the legislature. The taxpayers as well as the
Democrats wanted to put control of education in the hands of local authorities. See Watts &
Rockwell, supra note 18, at 782-84.
221. "In response to the radical regime's extravagance in taxing and spending, the drafters
of the Constitution of 1876 embedded that document with inhibitions against the exercise of
the taxing power and the expenditures of public money." Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. School
Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989).
222. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1876, amended 1883). See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
223. "By the adoption of the amendment the voters evidenced their intent that the initiative for the formation and maintenance of school districts be vested in those most directly
affected: the local citizenry.... [P]eople intended to set up a school system retaining a significant degree of control." Edgewood I, 761 S.W.2d at 867.
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tax in the political branch most closely accountable to the people. 22 4 The
legislature has traditionally been considered the most representative
branch. 225 The framers' intentions, coupled with the express delegation to
the legislature of both the right to levy taxes and the duty to create a statewide system of public schools, clearly demonstrate that the first of Brennan's
factors is present in this case: namely, that the function has been allocated by
the constitution to a particular branch of government. 226
Edgewood I & II also satisfy Brennan's second criterion, 227 since the efficiency requirement lacks judicially cognizable standards. While the Texas
Constitution requires that an efficient system of public school education be
devised for the state,228 it does not indicate what such a system should entail.229 The constitution does not define what is meant by the term "efficient," nor does it provide guidelines for a court to use in making such a
determination. 2 30 The vague nature2 31 of the efficiency requirement has
prompted much criticism. For example, one commentator has pointed out
that the term "efficient system," as used in the Texas Constitution, is not
232
only unhelpful, but potentially harmful.
As yet, no court has found an adequate definition of "efficient, ' 233 "uni224. Id.

225. Although the Texas Supreme Court is elected, they are not accountable to the people
to the same extent as the legislature. In fact, some argue that Texas in practice has an electiveappointive system:
The full effects of a partisan election system may be blunted somewhat in Texas
because up to 80% of all Texas judges face no election opposition.... Electoral
political considerations may also be minimized because the Governor appoints
approximately 50% of all Texas judges to their first term.... the appointee then
has the advantage of incumbency.
A. SMITH, THE IMPACT OF THE TEXAS CONSTrUTION ON THE JUDICIARY 70-71 (1973).
226. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
227. Id.
228. "[I]t shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable
provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools." TEX.
CONST. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added).
229. It has been suggested that an efficient system is "one that would 'give a substantial
education to every child in the county.'" S. MCKAY, DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 351 (1920).
230. The Texas court of appeals recognized this exact problem in its Edgewood I opinion
when it stated:
[t]hat provision does, of course, require that the school system be "efficient," but
the provision provides no guidance as to how this or any other court may arrive
at a determination of what is efficient or inefficient. Given the enormous complexity of a school system educating three million children, this Court concludes
that which is, or is not, "efficient" is essentially a political question not suitable
for judicial review.
Edgewood I, 761 S.W.2d at 867.
231. S. McKAY, DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at
328 (1928) (statement of delegate West).
232. "No 'suggestion was given as to what was to be understood by the term efficient system; and in the absence of all recognized standards of educational merit, this catchword was
not merely meaningless but deceptive and harmful.'" F. EBY, supra note 74, at 158, 159.
233. TEX. CONT. art. VII, § 1 (1876). But see Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (1989)
("[T]he legislature must make 'suitable' provision for an 'efficient' system for the 'essential'
purpose of a 'general diffusion of knowledge.' While these are admittedly not precise terms,
they do provide a standard .... ").
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"thorough," 235 or any of the other terms commonly included in
state educational provisions. Although the California Supreme Court in Serrano 236 maintained that fiscal neutrality was the appropriate standard by
which to judge a system's adequacy, 237 this theory has been rejected outright
239
by the United States Supreme Court2 38 and has been criticized by others.
In fact, studies have shown that equal educational spending does not ensure
equal opportunity to education. 24° The absence of any correlation between
expenditures and educational quality suggests that fiscal neutrality is probably an inappropriate standard by which to judge a particular system's efficiency. 24 1 Furthermore, the traditional definition of efficient does not
include any reference to equality. 242 The term could just as logically refer to
a system that produces results in the quickest and least disruptive manner. 243 It is not clear that the current system of financing fails to do so. The
definitional problems described above only briefly outline the questionable
nature of such a judicial inquiry. 244 One thing that does seem clear, however, is that the efficiency clause lacks sufficiently identifiable standards for
the Texas courts to employ in determining the appropriate system for school
financing. 245 As a result, Edgewood I & II seem appropriate cases in which
to apply the political question doctrine.
form,

' 2 34

234. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1876).
235. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (1844, amended 1875).

236. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), decision on remand aff'd, 18
Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
237. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 940.
238. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973).
239. The District Court in the Edgewood II case admitted:
The goal of the constitution is not fiscal neutrality, but efficiency. Fiscal neutrality is merely a test for efficiency .... Putting the test of fiscal neutrality in its
proper place, one concludes that it is not to be applied rigidly. The Supreme
Court itself used more general terms when it said: "Children who live in poor
districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially
equal opportunity to have access to educational funds." A dollar for dollar
match is not required.
Edgewood II, No. 362516, at 30-31 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas,
Sept. 24, 1990),judgment vacated in part, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). See also Thompson v.
Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635, 654 (1975) ("It is oversimplistic to argue that each
child in Idaho should have the same amount of money spent on its education as does every
other child.") (concurring opinion).
240. The Coleman Report revealed that the causal relationship between per pupil expenditures and the quality of education is extremely weak. OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 20-21, 312-16

(1966).
241. Dugan, The Constitutionalityof School FinanceSystems UnderState Law: New York's
Turn, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 573, 600-01 (1976).

242. Webster's Dictionary defines efficient as: "Being or involving the immediate agent
and producing an effect, productive of desired effects." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DicTIONARY 359 (1973).

243. At the constitutional convention of 1875, the proponents of a state-subsidized school
system supported the inclusion of the term efficient in Article VII "on the theory that efficiency was the equivalent of simplicity .... TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1, interp. commentary
375 (Vernon 1955).
244. Dugan characterizes the situation as "[t]he plethora of definitional obstacles and other
intangible concepts that pervade the subject of school finance." Dugan, supra note 241, at 604.
245. Edgewood 1, 761 S.W.2d at 867.
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Not only does the issue of public school financing leave the judiciary without any clear-cut standards for determining a particular system's efficiency,
it requires the judiciary to make a choice between conflicting public policies.246 A decision to increase state funding for education represents the
court's adoption of one policy concern over another. For example, Article
VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution articulates the framers' belief in the
importance of education and the necessity of providing a system of public
schools for the children of the state. 247 At the same time, Article VII, Section 3 demonstrates the ratifier's reluctance to put the power to tax into the
hands of individuals who were not directly accountable to the people. 248 By
deciding to impose a new system of public school financing designed to eradicate financial disparities among school districts, the court will necessarily be
requiring that more money be spent on education. This decision represents
the court's conclusion that the first policy consideration pulls more weight
than the second. Such a decision is more properly put in the hands of the
legislature, since they clearly have more expertise in dealing with the complex trade-offs involved in such a decision. 249
If a tax increase is not imposed to fund a new system, existing state funds
will have to be reallocated. 250 This too requires the court to make an initial
public policy determination. 25 1 By increasing the amount of state tax revenues that will be allocated to public education, the court will necessarily be
decreasing the amount spent on other programs. 252 For example, a decision
to increase funds for education and decrease funds for public utility facilities
requires the judiciary to make a decision regarding the relative importance
of each service. This type of decision should be made by the people that
benefit from such services, and their voices will be heard through their representatives in the legislature.
Furthermore, if equalization can be required with respect to education,
there seems to be little reason to disallow such action with respect to other
246. As pointed out by Dugan, "[i]t is impossible for courts to decide these cases 'without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.'" Dugan, supra
note 241, at 605 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
247. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
248. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1876, amended 1883).
249. "The lack of policy review is a special problem when financial resources are involved.
Court decisions in this area may force the state to radically reallocate its financial resources."
D. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 270 (1977).
250. "Under our political system, it is assumed that judges should play only a limited role
in making important choices about the allocation of public resources." Anderson, supra note
86, at 170.
251. Anderson states:
Since any blend of state and local components in a system of public education
finance will have significant allocative consequences, any judicial prescription in
the area will necessarily involve the judiciary in allocating the public resources
to some degree.... The choice of so basic a matter as the degree of local control
of funding levels would appear to be too fundamental and too far-reaching to be
left to the judges if traditional notions of legitimacy are to be respected.
Id.
252. Id. at 163 (suggesting that a court-ordered increase in educational spending could
result in lower welfare spending).
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state or municipal services. 253 As Dugan points out, a decision having such
widespread and potentially far-reaching effects should be left to the popularly elected officials. 254 Because decisions like the ones in Edgewood I & II
can have such far-reaching effects on state funding, they are best left to the
legislature. In order to avoid judicial determination, the Texas Supreme
Court should have invoked the political question doctrine.
The final three factors outlined by Justice Brennan are not applicable in
this context because they deal primarily with political questions in the context of foreign affairs. 255 However, their relative unimportance in the domestic arena does not warrant a complete abdication of the political question
doctrine in situations involving primarily domestic problems. The presence
of the first three factors creates a strong argument that Edgewood I & II are
256
appropriate cases for application of the political question doctrine.
Recent cases in both state and federal courts suggest that the political
question doctrine is now often ignored by the judiciary and may in fact be
slowly eroding away. 257 Based on previous court decisions on desegrega-

tion258 and reapportionment, 25 9 many courts faced with school finance
problems have concluded that judicial intrusion into the legislative arena is
justified. 260 However, the relative acceptance of judicial activism in these
areas does not warrant the extension of such judicial intrusion into other
261
controversial areas of public policy.
Other problems associated with school financing litigation suggest that the
issue is not suited to judicial resolution. 262 The complex issues inherent in
the public school financing arena demand that determination of the appropriate financing system be left to the legislature, especially in light of their
relative expertise with the intricate problems of state funding. 263
The problems stem from the fact that the judicial and legislative methods
of problem-solving are fundamentally different. The legislature focuses on
society's problems as a whole.264 The judiciary, on the other hand, resolves
253. Dugan, supra note 241, at 607.
254. "A decision which has the potential to so change the structure of our society should

be made only by duly elected lawmakers." Id.
255. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
256. But see Dugan, supra note 241 (where Dugan argues that Brennan's last three factors
are applicable to the school financing litigation).
257. See supra notes 105-26 and accompanying text.
258. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 109 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1990); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
259. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
260. See supra note 160.
261. But see Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 495-501 (1980); Fiss, Forward:The Formsof Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 32 (1979) (arguing that judicial intrusion is necessary in the face of legislative
inaction).

262. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
263. "[Wlhen a state supreme court declares its system of school financing to be unconstitutional, its impact can have repercussions for the entire state financial system." Note, supra
note 134, at 1395 (footnotes omitted).
264. See Anderson, supra note 86, at 198-99.
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disputes between individuals. 265 Because of the courts' traditionally narrow
focus, it is not prepared to resolve major societal problems that have farreaching consequences.2 66 Mistakes in litigation between individuals have a
limited effect. Errors made by courts resolving public school financing
problems, however, necessarily have broader implications. Since decisions
with respect to educational financing directly affect the funding of other state
services, a mistake with respect to educational spending will necessarily up2 67
set the entire system of state funding.

A related problem presented by judicial resolution of public school financing issues stems from the "generalist nature of our judges. ' 26 8 Members of
the bench are typically expected to be knowledgeable in broad areas of the
law.2 69 Indeed this quality has been primarily responsible for fostering the
degree of respect traditionally afforded the judiciary. 270 Problems arise,
however, when judges are asked to make intricate decisions on highly techni-

cal issues such as the ones involved in public school finance. 27 1 In addition,
272
as Anderson points out, the "legal doctrine" is one of general principles.

As such, the nature of the legal doctrine does not lend itself to determination
273
of specific and highly technical problems.

The problem is confounded further by the admittedly inadequate factfinding capacity of the court, 274 as well as the nature of the available facts.
265. Professor Lehne concludes that public school financing cases "do not conform to the
traditional model ... [Tihe court system... was not examining a private dispute between
private parties... [instead they were considering the] validity of established public policies. In
such circumstances the bipolar format of courtroom adjudication made little sense." See Anderson, supra note 87, at 169 (quoting R. LEHNE, supra note 202, at 198-99).
266. "A Court lacks ability to minimize in advance unintended consequences which take
place after its decision or to correct them." See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 249, at 51.
267. The sort of state-local institutional issues presented in school finance litigation
involve highly intricate interrelationships and complex patterns of effects.
Fuller calls such issues 'polycentric'-issues in which the resolution of any part
of a question has complex and largely unforeseeable repercussions on the remaining web of issues. For resolving issues of that kind, the form of ordering we
If judges are given such tasks, they
call adjudication is simply not suited ....
cease being judges in all but a nominal sense, and become mediators, legislators,
or other political functionaries.
See Anderson, supra note 86, at 168-69. Furthermore, "School finance litigation presents
problems which involve a complex group of decisions. Judgment on each decision depends on
the judgments made upon each of the others. Professor Fuller argues that these are cases
which require ad hoc discretion, negotiation, or even legislation, but not adjudication." Note,
supra note 134, at 1420 (footnotes omitted).
268. Anderson, supra note 86, at 167.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Anderson points out that the "generalist" quality is "a highly prized quality in which
lies much of what we call wisdom, but which is not profitably employed in vast enterprises
requiring intimate familiarity with technical, sophisticated, and highly controverted questions
of statistical method and educational policy." Id.
272. Id. at 169.
273. "[P]rincipals of this generality are of limited utility in resolving specific questions of
educational policy. As the New Jersey experience makes clear, the attempt to answer specific
substantive questions with highly general legal criteria comes very close to making a mockery
of the entire process of adjudication." Anderson, supra note 87, at 169 (footnotes omitted).
See also Note, supra note 134, at 1416-17.
274. See Note, supra note 134.
...
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The fact that courts must rely on the litigants to provide them with relevant
information is less than encouraging.2 75 In addition, the facts themselves
may not be sufficiently reliable.2 76 Studies that have been undertaken present conclusions that tend to be not only highly technical, but also
277
controversial.
Even if the information available was sufficiently reliable, judicial resolution is still an inappropriate response to the problems associated with public
school financing. Creating and administering a statewide system of public
school education requires constant supervision, and courts are simply not
designed to undertake such monitoring activities.2 78 Educational requirements are in a constant state of change and the court's ability to respond to
these needs quickly and effectively is limited at best.2 7 9 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, Anderson points out that "[u]nder our political system, it
is assumed that judges should play only a limited role in making important
'280
choices about the allocation of public resources.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Texas Supreme Court's decisions in Edgewood I & II are representative of a growing trend among state courts to engage in judicial activism.
Court resolution of school financing issues is clearly an extension from past
cases where judicial activism has been generally accepted. If allowed in this
case, however, there is little to prevent further extensions in later cases. Judicial intrusion in the form of court-ordered tax increases and reallocation of
state funds is problematic for a number of reasons. First, as evidenced by
the events surrounding the Robinson decision, courts are ill-prepared to address the problems associated with enforcing their public school financing
decisions. Second, the complex issues involved in state financing of education are ill-suited to judicial determination. The nature of the school financing issue, as well as the nature of the judicial branch, suggests that courts
should avoid judicial resolution of the problem. Third, if the courts are allowed to restructure state funding of public schools, there is little to stop
275. See id.
276. For a good discussion of the problems of social science data with respect to school
financing, see Anderson, supra note 86, at 164-67.
277. [M]ost social science experts would readily admit that current evaluation efforts are relatively primitive and cannot readily serve as bases for policy decisions about education. Until reliability is very sharply increased, and relevance
is convincingly established, courts should be very cautious about using the limited and tentative conclusions of this research for definitive, concrete policymaking. It is especially dangerous to do so when the court is being asked to order
long-term and fundamental institutional changes.
Id. at 167 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, supra note 134, at 1419.
278. The judicial process embraces very limited powers of continuous supervision.
As needs change, as priorities shift, as fiscal conditions alter, and as perceptions
modify (and these permutations seem the only real certainties), overseeing any
substantive educational program, or monitoring and evaluating any educational
system are not the sorts of things courts can be expected to do.
Anderson, supra note 86, at 168.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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them from restructuring funding of other state programs. These problems
clearly establish that resolution of the school financing issue is more properly
left with the state legislature. The potential threat to both the separation of
powers doctrine and our system of checks and balances is ever-present. As a
result, courts should constantly be on the look-out for evidence of judicial
overreaching. Such a high degree of scrutiny is required since, taken to the
extreme, judicial activism ultimately threatens the most basic democratic
principles.

